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Abstract. Deliberate deceptiveness intended to gain an advantage is commonplace
in human and animal societies. In a social dilemma, an individual may only pretend to
be a cooperator to elicit cooperation from others, while in reality he is a defector. With
this as motivation, we study a simple variant of the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma
game entailing deceitful defectors and conditional cooperators that lifts the veil on the
impact of such two-faced behavior. Defectors are able to hide their true intentions
at a personal cost, while conditional cooperators are probabilistically successful at
identifying defectors and act accordingly. By focusing on the evolutionary outcomes
in structured populations, we observe a number of unexpected and counterintuitive
phenomena. We show that deceitful behavior may fare better if it is costly, and that
a higher success rate of identifying defectors does not necessarily favor cooperative
behavior. These results are rooted in the spontaneous emergence of cycling dominance
and spatial patterns that give rise to fascinating phase transitions, which in turn reveal
the hidden complexity behind the evolution of deception.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb, 89.65.-s
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1. Introduction
Natural selection favors the fittest under adversity and testing conditions. According
to Darwin’s The Origin of Species, organisms therefore change gradually over time to
give rise to the astonishing diversity of life that is on display today [1]. Sometimes,
the most effective change is pretending to be someone or something one is not. In
the animal world, mimicry is common to provide evolutionary advantages through an
increased ability to escape predation or by elevating chances of predatory success [2].
The mimics and the species they are trying to fool are in an arms race, each trying
to optimize their chances of survival while having to accommodate additional costs.
Beautiful examples of mimicry include the Pandora sphinx moth that looks like a dead
leaf to avoid detection, the Flower Mantis that mimic flowers to lure prey, and the many
insects that have adopted the yellow and black stripes common to bees and wasps to fool
others they are precisely that. Cuckoos are particularly cunning and famous for their
breeding behavior. A female cuckoo lays its egg in the nest of a completely different
species of bird, simply because it wants to avoid spending energy on raising offspring. An
important mechanism for getting away with such behavior lies in the ability of cuckoos
to cleverly deceive their host [3]. First, the egg the cuckoo lays is very similar to the host
species eggs, and second, when the cuckoo chick hatches, it mimics the calls made by a
whole brood of the host species chicks. In human societies, the ways of deception are
of course even more cunning and elaborate. Our advanced intellectual abilities convey
to us an impressive array of different strategies and actions by means of which we may
fool others into a different reality. Obviously, some forms of trickery involve little to no
additional costs, while others impose a significant burden on the practitioners.
Here we study the impact of such deceitful behavior on the evolution of cooperation
in a social dilemma. Like deceptiveness intended to gain an advantage, situations that
constitute social dilemmas are common in human and animal societies. In general, a
social dilemma implies that the collective wellbeing is at odds with individual success
[4]. Individuals are therefore tempted to defect and maximize their own profit, but
at the same time neglecting negative consequences such behavior has for the society
as a whole. A frequently quoted outcome of such selfishness is the “tragedy of the
commons” [5]. Indeed, the evolution of cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle
[6, 7], and it is one of the most important challenges to Darwin’s theory of evolution and
natural selection. If during the course of evolution only the fittest survive, why should
one sacrifice individual fitness for the benefit of unrelated others? While there is no
single answer to this question, several mechanisms are known that promote cooperative
behavior [8].
Evolutionary game theory [9, 10, 11] is long established as the theory of choice
for studying the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals, and likely the most
frequently studied social dilemma is the prisoner’s dilemma game [12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. Defection is the Nash equilibrium of the game,
as it is the optimal strategy regardless of the strategy of the opponent. Beyond the
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consideration of cooperators and defectors as the simplest competing strategies, one
of the most recent developments is the introduction of more advanced strategies that
engage in evolutionary social dilemmas [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35]. Typically,
individuals are endowed with cognitive skills, for example enabling them to identify the
actions of other players or to learn from the failures made in previous rounds of the
game. Along this line, unconditional strategies — cooperators that always cooperate
and defectors that always defect — constitute a simplification that deserves further
exploration since it is a fact that individuals, be it humans or animals, will likely behave
differently under different circumstances [31].
This invites the introduction of conditional strategies and deceptiveness [36, 37],
both of which we accommodate in the presently studied variant of the evolutionary
prisoner’s dilemma game. In particular, we introduce conditional cooperators (C) that
cooperate only with other cooperators but defect otherwise, and we introduce deceitful
defectors (X) that only pretend to be cooperative. In this way, we focus only on
the “darker” side of deception, although it is worth emphasizing that prosocial lies
with positive motivation have also been studied [38]. Consequently, we allow defectors
to go beyond pure defection (D), thus potentially providing a competitive answer to
conditional cooperators. In addition to the temptation to defect r, however, these
modifications introduce two additional parameters. Namely the probability p that a
conditional cooperator will correctly identify a pure defector and avoid being exploited,
and the cost γ that deceitful defectors need to bear in order to successfully belie
cooperation. For further details we refer to the Model section. The questions we seek
to answer within this theoretical framework are: What conditions allow the evolution
of deception? How large can affordable γ values be? And what is the role of the
effectiveness of conditional cooperators in identifying defectors? As we will show, the
answers to these questions are far from trivial. While low detection probabilities help
defectors and high hiding costs obviously work against the effectiveness of deception,
much more unexpectedly, we will also show how deceitful behavior may fare better if
it is costly, and how a higher success rate of identifying defectors does not necessarily
favor cooperative behavior. These results are due to the spontaneous emergence of cyclic
dominance and self-organized pattern formation, both of which give rise to continuous
and discontinuous phase transitions that highlight the complexity behind the evolution
of deception.
2. Model
2.1. Deceitful defectors and conditional cooperators
We consider a simple three-strategy social dilemma game where players can be deceitful
defectors (X), conditional cooperators (C), or pure defectors (D). The payoffs among
strategies are defined by the matrices
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A D C X
D 0 0 0
C 0 1 S
X −γ (T − γ) −γ
and
B D C X
D 0 T 0
C S 1 S
X −γ (T − γ) −γ
.
We use the payoff matrix A with probability p and the payoff matrix B with probability
1 − p. In matrix A the conditional cooperator correctly identifies pure defectors and
acts as a defector itself, while in matrix B the conditional cooperator fails to identify
pure defectors and thus decides to cooperate. In the latter case, strategies C and D are
simply unconditional cooperation and defection. Importantly, as a specific case of a more
general model [37], conditional cooperators always cooperate with deceitful defectors, as
the latter invest γ specifically to that effect. If we would allow conditional cooperators
to reveal also the deceptiveness of deceitful defectors the cost γ would simply always
constitute an evolutionary disadvantage.
Without loosing generality, we use the temptation to defect T = 1 + r and
the sucker’s payoff S = −r, thus building upon the traditional prisoner’s dilemma
formulation of an evolutionary social dilemma game. Here the parameter r > 0
determines the strength of the dilemma, and in what follows, we will present results
for r = 0.3 and r = 0.7, being representative for a moderate and a strong prisoner’s
dilemma, respectively.
2.2. Monte Carlo simulations
We perform Monte Carlo simulations of the evolutionary social dilemma on a square
lattice of size L2 with periodic boundary conditions. The square lattice is the simplest
of networks that allows us to go beyond well-mixed populations, and as such it enables
us to take into account the fact that the interactions among competing species are often
structured rather than random. By using the square lattice, we also continue a long-
standing tradition that has begun with the work of Nowak and May [39], who were the
first to show that the most striking differences in the outcome of an evolutionary game
emerge when the assumption of a well-mixed population is abandoned for the usage of
a structured population [14, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45].
Initially, each player on site x is designated either as a deceitful defector (sx = X), a
conditional cooperator (sx = C) or a pure defector (sx = D) with equal probability. The
Monte Carlo simulations comprise the following elementary steps. First, a randomly
selected player x acquires its payoff Πx by playing the game with its four nearest
neighbors. Next, one randomly chosen neighbor, denoted by y, also acquires its payoff
Πy in the same way. Lastly, player y adopts the strategy of player x with the probability
w(sx → sy) =
1
1 + exp[(Πy − Πx)/(K)]
, (1)
where K determines the level of uncertainty in the Fermi function [14]. The latter can
be attributed to errors in judgment due to mistakes and external influences that affect
the evaluation of the opponent. We use K = 0.1 throughout this work, which implies
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that better performing players are readily imitated, but it is not impossible to adopt
the strategy of a player performing worse. We note that the main results are robust to
variations of K and the strategy adoption rule, such as choosing the best or the better
performing neighbor for the imitation, and they remain qualitatively valid also on other
lattices and random networks where the degree distribution remains unchanged but the
links are uncorrelated.
Each full Monte Carlo step (MCS) gives a chance to every player to change its
strategy once on average. Depending on the proximity to phase transition points and
the typical size of emerging spatial patterns, we have varied the linear size of the lattice
from L = 400 to L = 6000 and the relaxation time from 103 to 105 MCS to obtain
solutions that are valid in the large system size limit, and to ensure that the statistical
error is comparable with the size of the symbols in the figures. Importantly, even at such
a large system size (L = 6000), for certain parameter values close to discontinuous phase
transition points, the random initial state may not necessarily yield a relaxation towards
the most stable solution of the game. To verify the stability of different subsystem
solutions, we have therefore applied also prepared initial states (see for example Fig. 10
in [46]), and we have followed the same procedure as applied previously in [47, 48].
3. Results
3.1. Well-mixed populations
Before presenting the main results obtained in structured populations, we briefly
describe the evolutionary outcomes in well-mixed populations, where players interact
with the whole population and choose competitors randomly [37].
In the p = 1 limit, where pure defectors are always uncovered, strategy C is superior
to strategy D. This relation, however, is reversed if p < r
1+r
. For p values in-between, a
bistable competition between C andD is possible, whereby the final outcome depends on
the initial concentration of the competing strategies. In other words, C and D cannot
coexist regardless of the value of p. The coexistence of C and X is also impossible,
because deceitful defectors dominate cooperators if γ < r, while otherwise strategy C is
superior to strategy X . Lastly, we note that D always beats X because the latter have
to bear the additional cost γ.
As a consequence, strategy C prevails in the whole population if the values of p
and γ are sufficiently high. Similarly, the full D phase is attainable in the small p limit.
A mixed equilibrium, where all three competing strategies coexist, is also possible if
(1 − p)r(1 + r) < γ < p(1 + r) and γ < r are fulfilled simultaneously. Although
these results already provide useful insight into the impact and evolutionary stability of
deception, we next focus on studying evolutionary outcomes in structured populations.
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Figure 1. Full γ − p phase diagram, as obtained for r = 0.3. Solid lines denote
continuous phase transitions. The vertical resolution hides the intricate structure of
the phase diagram for intermediate values of γ and p, which we therefore show enlarged
in the right panel. Stable solutions include the three-strategy C +D +X phase, two-
strategy C +D and C +X phases, as well as the absorbing D and C phase.
3.2. Structured populations
In structured populations, we first focus on the moderate limit of the prisoner’s dilemma
game that is obtained for r = 0.3. The left panel of Fig. 1 shows the full γ − p
phase diagram, which describes all possible stable solutions. Evidently, the richness
of solutions is greater than in well-mixed populations. In general, small detection
probabilities, when conditional cooperators frequently fail to correctly identify pure
defectors, are beneficial for the evolution of defection, thus yielding an absorbing D
phase as the only stable solution in this region of the phase diagram, regardless of the
cost of deception. As the effectiveness of conditional cooperators increases, the pure D
phase transforms into a two-strategy D + C phase. This solution, which is absent in
well-mixed populations, is due to the aggregation of cooperators into compact clusters,
by means of which a stable coexistence of the two strategies becomes possible within
a narrow band of p (see also the right panel of Fig. 1). This is a purely spatial effect
that is rooted in network reciprocity [39]. If both γ and p are large, the D + C phase
terminates into an absorbing C phase, while for sufficiently low values of γ deceitful
defectors become viable, either through the emergence of a two-strategy C +X phase
or the emergence of a three-strategy C+D+X phase. Within the latter the competing
strategies may dominate each other cyclically, although the stable coexistence of all three
strategies in the D + C + X phase does not always involve cyclic dominance. Several
aspects of these results are counterintuitive and unexpected. Foremost, one would expect
that decreasing values of p will impair the evolution of C, and that increasing values of
γ will be detrimental for X . But this is not necessarily the case. In fact, as the value of
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Figure 2. Cross-section of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 1, as obtained for p = 1.
Depicted are stationary fractions of the three competing strategies in dependence on
the cost of deceit γ. As the value of γ increases, the three-strategy C +D +X phase
first gives way to the two-strategy C +X phase, and subsequently to the absorbing C
phase. In this cross-section all phase transitions are continuous. We emphasize that
the rise of the fraction of X as γ increases (before the extinction of D) is an unexpected
and counterintuitive evolutionary outcome that can only be explained by means of the
spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance amongst all three competing strategies, as
illustrated in Fig. 3.
p decreases, the first to die out are the deceitful defectors, giving way to a mixed C+D
phase. Moreover, as γ increases, the first to vanish from the three-strategy phase are
the pure defectors, thus yielding the C +X phase. If γ > 0.401 and p > 0.2664, then
only C can survive. Interestingly, the two two-strategy phases are always separated by
the three-strategy D + C + X phase, as illustrated clearly in the enlarged part of the
phase diagram depicted in the right panel of Fig. 1.
Representative cross-sections of the phase diagram provide a more quantitative
insight into the different phase transitions depicted in Fig. 1. In Fig. 2, we first show
how the fractions of the three strategies vary in dependence on the cost γ at p = 1, where
conditional cooperators are 100% effective in identifying pure defectors. When the cost
is small, all three strategies coexist in a stable D+C+X phase. As γ increases, deceitful
defectors initially suffer, but the actual victims turn out to be the pure defectors — the
main rivals of the deceitful defectors. Based on the presented results, we may conclude
that, up to a certain point, deceitful behavior fares better if it is costly. Put differently,
the larger the value of γ, the higher the fraction of strategy X in the stationary state.
Only after D die out does the trend reverse, and larger values of γ actually have the
expected impact of lowering the evolutionary success of deceitful defectors, to the point
when the latter finally die out to give rise to the absorbing C phase.
This evolutionary paradox, namely that deceitful behavior fares better if it is
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Figure 3. Consecutive snapshots of the square lattice, illustrating the spontaneous
emergence of cyclic dominance from a random initial state between deceitful defectors
(green), conditional cooperators (blue), and the pure defectors (red). The snapshots
are taken at 60, 100, 120 and 160 MCS from top left to bottom right, respectively.
Invasions proceed according to the C → D → X → C closed loop of dominance.
Parameter values are: r = 0.3, p = 1, γ = 0.02, and L = 100.
costly, can only be explained through the self-organized spatial patterns that emerge
spontaneously and drive cyclic dominance among the three competing strategies. As
shown in Fig. 3, traveling waves indeed emerge, where C beats D, D beats X , and X
beats C to close the loop of dominance. The C → D → X → C loop of dominance is
clearly inferable from the presented snapshots, as the initial C wave (blue) spreads into
the sea of D (red). The pure defectors, on the other hand, invade the territory of X
(green), which in turn spread into the territory of C.
Returning to the cross-sections of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 1, we show
in Figs. 4 and 5 how the fractions of the three strategies vary in dependence on the
probability p at γ = 0.2 and γ = 0.31, respectively. If the probability to revealD is small,
then conditional cooperators are unable to survive. Consequently, deceitful defectors do
not exist either, as their “targets” (C) are not available, and the direct competition
with D obviously leaves them at a disadvantage due to non-zero γ. As p increases,
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Figure 4. Cross-section of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 1, as obtained for
γ = 0.2. Depicted are stationary fractions of the three competing strategies in
dependence on the probability p. As the value of p increases, the absorbing D phase
first gives way to the two-strategy C+D phase, and subsequently to the three-strategy
C + D + X phase. In this cross-section all phase transitions are continuous. We
emphasize that the rise of the fraction of D as p increases (just after the emergence of
X) is again an unexpected and counterintuitive evolutionary outcome that can only
be explained by means of the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance amongst all
three competing strategies (see main text for details).
the absorbing D phase gives way to the two-strategy C + D phase, which is possible
due to network reciprocity and is thus a purely spatial effect. Interestingly, weakening
D further by elevating p will initially generate more D players in the stationary state.
As the value of p increases further D do begin to decline on the expense of C, but
on the other hand, X emerges and serves as an additional target for D. One might
expect that increasing p further will support C because they will not let D players
exploit them. While the fraction of D indeed decreases, this in turn paves the way for
deceitful defectors, who can finally capitalize on their investment γ. Together, these
“plus” and “minus” effects will nullify each other and leave the fraction of conditional
cooperators practically unaffected, despite of their elevated efficiency in detecting pure
defectors. Thus, again unexpectedly, a higher success rate of identifying defectors does
not necessarily favor cooperative behavior.
Notably, a qualitatively different final phase is reached if we apply a higher value
of γ, as shown in Fig. 5. Here the fraction of X cannot raise as high, which in turn
provides less targets for pure defectors, who therefore die out more easily. In the absence
of D, however, the conditional cooperators and deceitful defectors can coexist, which is
again made possible by the clustering of cooperators and is thus a purely spatial effect.
Naturally, if we increase the cost further, then strategy X cannot survive either, and
the population evolves from an absorbing D to the absorbing C phase via a coexisting
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Figure 5. Cross-section of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 1, as obtained for
γ = 0.31. Depicted are stationary fractions of the three competing strategies in
dependence on the probability p. As the value of p increases, the absorbing D phase
first gives way to the two-strategy C+D phase, then to the three-strategy C +D+X
phase, and finally to the two-strategy C +X phase. Evidently, sufficiently increasing
the value of pmay eradicate pure defectors and thus pave the way for deceitful defectors
to capitalize on their investment γ. Due to network reciprocity, however, conditional
cooperators never die out but rather form the C +X phase.
C +D phase (cross-section not shown).
In the strong limit of the prisoner’s dilemma game that is obtained for r = 0.7, we
observe solutions that are qualitatively different from those obtained for r = 0.3. Due to
the large temptation to defect, pure defectors and conditional cooperators are unable to
coexist in the absence of deceitful defectors. Instead, below pc = 0.5231, pure defectors
will prevail, while above this critical value conditional cooperators will dominate the
whole population. Remarkably, the consideration of deceitful defectors not only results
in the lack of the C + D phase, but gives rise also to the emergence of an absorbing
C phase at an intermediate value of p, even if the cost of deception is moderate. The
phase diagram presented in Fig. 6 summarizes these fascinating evolutionary outcomes,
which indicate that belying cooperation may actually beget cooperation.
If we compare the two phase diagrams in Fig. 1 and Fig. 6, then we also find that
there exist certain solutions that remain valid independently of the strength of the social
dilemma. In addition to the dominance of D at low values of p and the dominance of
C at sufficiently high values of γ and p, our previous observation regarding the optimal
value of γ when C are efficient also remains valid. Namely, from the point of view of
X it is actually better to bear a larger cost of deceit than a small one, because the
former effectively prevents pure defectors to exploit these additional efforts aimed at
deceiving cooperators. In the absence of D, or when they are rare, the evolutionary
advantage of X can still manifest even at relatively large γ values, especially if r is also
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Figure 6. Full γ − p phase diagram, as obtained for r = 0.7. Solid lines denote
continuous phase transitions, while dashed lines denote discontinuous phase transitions.
As for the r = 0.3 case depicted in Fig. 1, here too the stable solutions include the
three-strategy C + D + X phase and the two-strategy C + X phase, as well as the
absorbing D and C phase. Evidently, there exist solutions that are independent of
the strength of the social dilemma, but there also exist significant differences, like the
nature of the phase transition points and the “replacement” of the two-strategy C+D
phase with the absorbing C phase.
large. Moreover, for r = 0.7 too, it is possible to observe that the highest detection
probability does not always ensure the highest density of conditional cooperators. Even
more strikingly, here an intermediate value of p can result in an absorbing C phase that
becomes unstable at higher p values.
Also worthy of attention are the phase transitions between the three-strategy
C + D + X phase and the absorbing C phase. When the cost of deception is large,
then as p decreases the frequency of X decreases gradually, as shown in the top panel
of Fig. 7. When X finally vanish, the competition between the remaining D and C
terminates in an absorbing C phase. As p decreases further, an abrupt transition to
an absorbing D phase occurs. However, if the cost γ is small, a qualitatively different
behavior can be observed, as shown in the top panel of Fig. 8. In this case, the average
frequency of X within the C + D + X phase remains nonzero, but the amplitude of
oscillations increases drastically as we approach the phase transition point.
Importantly, the increase in the amplitude of oscillations is not a finite size effect
because the amplitude grows even if we increase the system size. This effect can be
quantified by measuring the fluctuations of strategy X according to
χ =
L2
M
M∑
ti=1
(ρX(ti)− ρX)
2 , (2)
where M denotes the number of independent values measured in the stationary state.
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Figure 7. Top panel shows the cross-section of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 6,
as obtained for γ = 0.6. Depicted are stationary fractions of the three competing
strategies in dependence on the probability p. As the value of p increases, the absorbing
D phase changes abruptly to the absorbing C, followed by the gradual emergence of
deceitful defectors that give rise to the three-strategy C +D +X phase. The bottom
panel shows the fluctuation of the vanishing density of deceitful defectors ρX (see
Eq. 2) in dependence on p, as obtained for different system sizes that are indicated
in the figure legend. The always finite value of χ indicates that the amplitude of
oscillations can always be reduced by increasing the system size, thus confirming a
continuous phase transition.
As the bottom panel of Fig. 7 demonstrates, this quantity remains finite at large γ,
which means that the amplitude of oscillations can always be reduced by increasing the
system size L. The same quantity, however, behaves very differently at small γ. As
the bottom panel of Fig. 8 shows, the value of χ is diverging as we approach the phase
transition point, indicating that here the amplitude of oscillations cannot be lowered
and that X will inevitably die out. We note that a similar type of discontinuous phase
transition was already observed in the spatial public goods game with correlated positive
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Figure 8. Top panel shows the cross-section of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 6,
as obtained for γ = 0.05. Depicted are stationary fractions of the three competing
strategies in dependence on the probability p. As the value of p increases, the absorbing
D phase changes abruptly to the absorbing C, followed again by an abrupt emergence
of deceitful defectors that give rise to the three-strategy C + D + X phase. The
bottom panel shows the fluctuation of the vanishing density of deceitful defectors ρX
in dependence on p, as obtained for different system sizes that are indicated in the figure
legend. Unlike for γ = 0.6 (see Fig. 7), here the value of χ at the phase transition
point is diverging, increasing beyond bound even for very large L, and thus indicating
a fascinating discontinuous phase transition between the absorbing C phase and the
heterogeneous C +D +X phase.
and negative reciprocity, where cyclical dominance also emerged spontaneously between
the competing strategies [48]. These results thus reveal the hidden complexity behind
the evolution of deception, which appears to be commonplace in evolutionary settings
with three or more strategies in structured populations.
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4. Discussion
To summarize, we have shown that the introduction of conditional cooperators and
deceitful defectors to a social dilemma gives rise to many counterintuitive evolutionary
outcomes that can only be understood as a consequence of self-organized pattern
formation in structured populations. Spatial systems, where players have a limited
interaction range, allow the observation of rich behavior, including the formation of
propagating fronts due to the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance. In particular,
we have demonstrated the stable coexistence of all three competing strategies, as well as
the emergence of C+D and C+X two-strategy phases. Similarly to the results obtained
in well-mixed populations, in structured populations absorbing phases are also possible
at specific parameter values. Namely, if the conditional cooperators are ineffective
in identifying pure defectors, the latter dominate like under mean-field conditions.
Conversely, if the conditional cooperators are sufficiently effective and if the cost of
deception is high, then cooperative behavior dominates. Unexpectedly, our research
indicates that an imperfect ability of cooperators to properly detect defectors may be
beneficial for the evolution of cooperation, and that deceitful behavior may fare better if
it is costly. These results are rooted in the spontaneous emergence of cycling dominance
and complex spatial patterns. It is also worth emphasizing that these results are robust
and remain valid if we choose other strategy updating rules or interaction networks other
than lattices. For example, qualitatively similar evolutionary outcomes can be obtained
on random regular graphs.
We have also shown that continuous and discontinuous phase transitions separate
the different stable solutions, and that changing a model parameter may have highly
nontrivial and unexpected consequences. For example, the three-strategy C + D + X
phase may terminate continuously or abruptly, depending solely on the cost of deception.
This type of complexity is absent in traditional rock-scissors-paper or extended Lotka-
Volterra-type models where the cyclic dominance is hardwired in the food web [49].
Although the evolution of deception is also governed by cyclic dominance, the latter
emerges spontaneously, and therefore changing even a single parameter may influence
the effective invasion rates between all three competing strategies. We have made similar
observations in the realm of the spatial ultimatum game [47] and the spatial public goods
game with reward [50] and different types of punishment [46, 51], as well as in the spatial
public goods game with correlated positive and negative reciprocity [48]. Taken together,
this indicates that the reported evolutionary complexity is in fact much more frequent
than it might be assumed, and in fact appears to be commonplace in evolutionary
settings where three or more strategies compete in a structured population.
When introducing punishing cooperators to a social dilemma, the tension between
defectors and cooperators shifts to the tension between the cooperators that punish and
the cooperators that do not punish. Since the latter avoid the additional costs that need
to be invested for sanctioning defectors, they become second-order free-riders [52]. The
evolution of deception gives rise to a conceptually similar shift in the dilemma, only that
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it is reversed and applies from the point of view of defectors. The main competitors of
deceitful defectors are no longer cooperators, but rather the pure defectors who do not
invest in deception. Whether it pays to defect or not depends on the effectiveness of
the cooperators to correctly identify defectors. If conditional cooperation is effective,
defectors can survive only if they hide behind those who actually make an effort in
deceiving cooperators. Ultimately, this establishes the possibility of cyclic dominance
between the three competing strategies, and it gives rise to the reported unexpected
evolutionary outcomes. Specifically, for defectors it may be advantageous to bear a
significant cost aimed at deceiving cooperators, although this depends nontrivially also
on the efficiency of conditional cooperators.
Recent reviews attest to the fact that interdisciplinary approaches, linking together
knowledge from biology, ecology, sociology as well as applied mathematics and physics,
are successful in identifying new ways by means of which social dilemmas can be resolved
in favor of cooperation [8, 14, 40, 53], and they also help to understand the observed
complexity behind the riddles of evolution. We hope that our study will inspire further
research aimed at investigating the role of deceitful strategies in evolutionary games,
and we also hope that more experimental work will be carried out to clarify their role
by the evolution of human cooperation [54, 55, 56, 57].
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